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Abstract
After an eight year pause, gubernatorial elections returned to Russia in 2012. Formerly appointed gover-
nors are now being put to the electoral test, and the Kremlin is discovering the extent to which it sacrificed 
effective regional leadership for loyalty to the federal center. It now finds itself on the horns of a dilemma: 
if it continues to heap blame on regional leaders for economic failures and declining trust in the country’s 
political institutions, then the ranks of volunteers willing to serve as governor will dwindle. Yet if it seeks 
to attract capable candidates to stand for governor, it may be forced to decentralize power and to allow an 
opening of regional elections to more opposition candidates.
Retreat and Retrenchment
Despite then-President Dmitrii Medvedev’s notorious 
claim that it would be at least 100 years before guberna-
torial elections would be restored in Russia, the mass pro-
tests following the State Duma election in 2011 prompted 
their return ahead of schedule. While this was an out-
wardly liberalizing move, the new legislation permitting 
gubernatorial elections (Federal’nyi Zakon N 40-FZ, May 
2, 2012) made provision for a pair of so-called “filters” to 
prevent the appearance of “accidental” (sluchainye) can-
didates on the ballot. The “presidential filter” is exercised 
in the form of “consultations” conducted by the President 
with parties or with individual candidates. While these 
consultations are not required by law, the emerging prac-
tice is for Putin to meet with the heads of political par-
ties to discuss their gubernatorial candidates. It is worth 
nothing that Putin meets only with the party leadership 
in Moscow rather than meeting with regional branches 
of political parties, and he sometimes meets with parties 
that have no presence in the region in question. In effect, 
this form of consultation continues the previous practice 
by which leaders of political parties in Moscow would 
nominate gubernatorial candidates—often overruling the 
preferences of regional party branches—and it gives the 
Kremlin an informal veto over any potential candidate.
The “municipal filter” has received a great deal more 
attention than the presidential filter. Potential candidates 
for regional governorships are required to obtain the 
support of 5–10% of local council deputies and elected 
municipal heads, spread across 75% of municipal bodies 
throughout the region, in the form of notarized signa-
tures of support. The precise number of signatures is set 
by regional law, though most regions opt for the maxi-
mum of 10%. The total number of signatures a candidate 
may gather is capped at 5% above the required threshold, 
meaning in principle that no single candidate can soak 
up all the available signatures to squeeze out potential 
competitors. However, the dominance of governors over 
local government means that opposition candidates still 
face an uphill battle in securing the minimum number 
of signatures to be registered. This point was made viv-
idly clear in the September 2013 elections in Moscow 
and Moscow oblast’, in which incumbents Sergei Sobi-
anin and Andrei Vorob’ev (respectively) mobilized local 
deputies to ensure the registration of opposition candi-
dates Aleksei Naval’nyi and Gennadyi Gudkov.
While the local council deputies or elected heads can 
only support one candidate, the law restoring gubernato-
rial elections does not stipulate how to manage situations 
in which local actors provide signatures in support of more 
than one candidate. Over the first two rounds of guber-
natorial elections in October 2012 and September 2013, 
one finds multiple instances of candidates denied regis-
tration owing to the duplication of signatures from local 
deputies. In every case, the signatures have been counted 
in favor of the ruling party’s candidate with the duplicate 
signatures subtracted from opposition candidates’ peti-
tion for registration. There are no legal sanctions or reper-
cussions for local actors who offer multiple signatures in 
support of candidates. Hence, the municipal filter creates 
at least two opportunities for incumbents to block oppo-
sition candidates: first, by pressuring local deputies not to 
provide signatures in support of a candidate (or to pro-
vide duplicate signatures) and, second, in the inspection 
of signatures by regional electoral commissions.
In addition to the presidential and municipal filters, 
the law restoring gubernatorial elections includes a few 
interesting wrinkles that may affect the Kremlin’s ability 
to locate and secure effective gubernatorial candidates. 
First, governors are limited to two consecutive terms in 
office and the maximum term length is five years. How-
ever, term limits only apply from the law’s adoption in 
May 2012, meaning that sitting governors’ current terms 
will not count against them. Second, the law stipulates 
that any governor removed from office cannot run for 
governor in any region for at least two years. It further 
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specifies that a charge of corruption may serve as cause 
for dismissal under the foggy rubric of “loss of the Pres-
ident’s confidence.” Third, it creates a mechanism for 
converting appointed governors into elected governors 
if they leave office early, but only if they are appointed 
acting governor by Putin.
While the first round of gubernatorial elections in 
October 2012 went (mostly) according to plan, the Krem-
lin grew wary of the potential for gubernatorial elections 
in the North Caucasus to stimulate ethnic conflict. Putin 
singled out Dagestan as a region for which a non-elec-
toral option might be beneficial, arguing that such an 
option would help to preserve indigenous power-shar-
ing arrangements between Avars and Dargins. The non-
electoral option was made into law in the spring of 2013, 
allowing regional parliaments to choose from a slate of 
gubernatorial candidates nominated by political parties. 
As with the nomination process for direct elections, any 
party—including those with no presence in regional 
parliaments—may nominate gubernatorial candidates. 
While the law does not specify that it is meant to apply 
solely to Russia’s ethnic republics, this meaning was made 
clear in Putin’s public comments. By contrast, Russian 
provinces were dissuaded from foregoing direct elections. 
In response to this disciplinary subtext, republican par-
liaments in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan refused to con-
sider the legislation. Nor was the non-electoral option 
supported in Dage stan, as Magomedsalam Magomedov 
openly supported holding direct elections as did the popu-
lar mayor of the republic’s capital, Said Amirov. Megome-
dov soon resigned and was replaced with the more pliant 
Ramazan Abdulatipov, who oversaw the adoption of the 
non-electoral option for the republic. Amirov was later 
arrested in June 2013. The non-electoral option further 
met with resistance in Ingushetiia, as well, though both 
republics ultimately bowed to the Kremlin. In anticipa-
tion of the 2014 gubernatorial elections, North Ossetia 
moved in October 2013 to adopt the non-electoral option.
The Naval’ny Effect?
When Boris Yeltsin’s appointed governors were put to 
the test in the first large round of gubernatorial elec-
tions in 1995–7, nearly two-thirds of his incumbents 
lost office. By contrast, it is particularly telling that none 
of Putin’s or Medvedev’s appointed governors have lost 
office in the 13 gubernatorial elections since October 
2012. Moreover, each incumbent or acting governor has 
been elected on average with 70.6% of the vote, typi-
cally with fairly low levels of voter turnout (see Table 1).
The problem with this model is that it fails to improve 
on the previous system of gubernatorial appointments. 
The tendency towards appointing outsiders as governors 
in order to break up regional clans accelerated during 
the Medvedev presidency, leading to nearly a wholesale 
replacement of Russia’s governors, including even power-
ful governors like Sverdlovsk’s Eduard Rossel’, Moscow’s 
Yuri Luzhkov and Tatarstan’s Mintimer Shaimiev. The 
rotation of regional outsiders into governors’ offices may 
have improved loyalty to the federal center, but one might 
easily mistake loyalty for dependence on the federal center. 
Indeed, the popularity of appointed governors declined 
at the same time that their performance was subject to 
increased scrutiny from the Kremlin. Little changed with 
the restoration of gubernatorial elections. Rather than 
leaving voters to judge a governor’s performance, the 
Kremlin places its favored candidate in the pole position 
and secures an uncompetitive field in advance of each 
election to guarantee the desired outcome.
As a result of the Kremlin’s attempts to manage 
gubernatorial elections, a genuinely competitive election 
actually appears as a failure for the regime. It is in this 
crucial sense that the Moscow mayoral election in Sep-
tember 2013 may serve as a watershed event. The election 
pitted Sobianin against opposition leader Naval’nyi in a 
bid to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the election. 
Naval’nyi ran an unexpectedly robust campaign and 
Sobianin’s lead dwindled to a bare majority—and possi-
bly less, according to exit polls conducted by Naval’nyi’s 
supporters. While the Moscow election was hailed as a 
stirring confirmation of popular support for Sobianin 
(and, by extension, for Putin’s regime), it stirred memo-
ries of United Russia’s surprisingly poor showing in the 
2011 State Duma elections. Moreover, it cast a shadow 
on every other gubernatorial election in which incum-
bents cruised to easy victories against token opposition. 
In future gubernatorial elections, incumbents now face 
a fundamental dilemma: seek to win a genuinely com-
petitive election and thereby enhance one’s legitimacy, 
or conduct a perfunctory and unconvincing campaign 
with a guaranteed win but little in the way of job security.
From the center’s perspective, there is a rising crisis 
of legitimacy in the regions for which the most efficient 
solution—competitively elected governors—may also 
be the least acceptable. However, the Kremlin is find-
ing that neither carrot nor stick may be a sufficient alter-
native to achieve its aims. In terms of oversight, Putin 
has turned up the heat on Russia’s governors. In spring 
2013, he decreed that government ministers may pro-
pose that governors be fired from office—a measure that 
was framed as increasing regional accountability to the 
central government, though its practical effect may be 
to shift the procedural burden of removing governors 
from the Presidential Administration to Prime Minis-
ter Medvedev’s government. In addition to making cor-
ruption an explicit cause for dismissal, governors may 
also be held accountable for incidents of ethnic conflict 
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on their territory. Following the pogrom in Biriulevo 
on October 13, 2013, Putin directed governors to set 
up monitoring of inter-ethnic relations and to develop 
plans for managing inter-ethnic relations. Mayors may 
now be dismissed for failing to prevent ethnic clashes, 
and governors may not be far behind.
 Given this degree of scrutiny, it is not surprising that 
the Kremlin is having a hard time persuading people to 
leave their federal jobs or State Duma seats to become 
governors. For the appointment to be attractive, pro-
spective governors must have a real chance at improving 
regional economies. In this context, a revival of discus-
sions about devolving power to regional governments is 
being pushed by Russia’s government, led by Medvedev 
and First Deputy Prime Minister Igor’ Shuvalov. In a 
meeting with Federation Council leaders on September 
23, 2013, Medvedev suggested that the regions ought 
to determine which federal powers need to be trans-
ferred to the regions to facilitate investment and mod-
ernization, and even raised the possibility of returning 
to the practice of bilateral power-sharing treaties. Of 
course, combining real economic autonomy with gen-
uine electoral mandates raises the prospect of a revival 
of regionalism in Russian politics. There is little doubt 
that the Kremlin is deeply concerned about this possi-
bility and incumbent campaigns since 2012 have care-
fully avoided any mention of regionalism that isn’t com-
mensurate with a broader patriotism.
Putin has publicly committed himself to continuing 
gubernatorial elections and any retreat from that posi-
tion is likely to be interpreted as a public admission of 
failure. What remains unclear is whether the regime is 
genuinely willing to decentralize some power and risk 
some uncertainty in regional elections in exchange for 
enhancing its legitimacy on the national level. As for-
mer Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin recently observed, 
the absence of clearly delineated powers for the regions 
allows governors to absolve themselves of responsibility 
for matters over which they have no authority while the 
president and parliament are “guilty of everything.” In 
assessing this year’s gubernatorial elections, the Kremlin 
claimed that the outcome of Moscow’s election should 
demonstrate for the opposition the value of choosing sys-
temic competition. The real issue is whether the same 
value can be demonstrated for Russia’s governors?
About the Author
J. Paul Goode is Associate Professor of Political Science, Director of the Center for the Study of Nationalism, and 
Coordinator for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of The Decline 
of Regionalism in Putin’s Russia: Boundary Issues (Routledge, 2011).
Further Readings
• Golosov, Grigorii V. “The 2012 Political Reform in Russia.” Problems of Post-Communism 59 (2012): 3–14.
• Reuter, Ora John, and Graeme B. Robertson. “Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence 
from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments.”
• The Journal of Politics 74, no. 04 (2012): 1023–1037.
• Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. “Gestalt Switch in Russian Federalism: The Decline in Regional Power Under Putin.” 
Comparative Politics 45, no. 3 (2013): 357–376.
Table 1: Incumbent Votes in Gubernatorial Elections, 2012–2013
Region Incumbent/Acting Governor Incumbent Vote Turnout
Amur Oleg Kozhemiako 77.28% 36.72%
Belgorod Evgenii Savchenko 77.64% 59.49%
Briansk Nikolai Denin 65.22% 47%
Novgorod Sergei Mitin 75.95% 42.81%
Riazan’ Oleg Kovalev 64.43% 43.67%
AVERAGE 2012 72.1% 45.94%
Chukotka Roman Kopin 79.84% 62.53%
Khabarovsk Viacheslav Shport 63.84% 32.67%
Khakassia Viktor Zimin 63.41% 36.3%
Magadan Vladimir Pechennyi 73.11% 62.53%
Moscow Sergei Sobianin 51.37% 31.54%
Moscow oblast’ Andrei Vorob’ev 79.05% 37.69%
Vladimir Svetlana Orlova 74.73% 27.67%
Zabaikal Konstantin Il’kovskii 71.67% 31.98%
AVERAGE 2013 69.63% 40.36%*
*Turnout figures for 2013 do not include absentee ballots
